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PROTECTING THE PEOPLE: EXPANDING TITLE VII’S
PROTECTION AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION TO
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
It is legal in many states to discriminate in the workplace on the
basis of sexual orientation.1 Meanwhile, it is uniformly illegal to dis-
criminate in the workplace on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”2 Workplace discrimination on the basis of these
five traits is illegal because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
expressly prohibits such discriminatory behavior.3 However, work-
place discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not one of
Title VII’s enumerated protections.4 Because “sexual orientation” is
not enumerated, the law as it stands today in most states does not
protect an employee who has been discriminated against on the basis
of her sexual orientation.5
1. See Courtney Joslin, Protection for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Employees
Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, HUM. RTS. MAG., https://www.americanbar.org/
publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol31_2004/summer2004/
irr_hr_summer04_protectlgbt.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). See also State Maps of Laws and
Policies, Human Rights Campaign, https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment (last updated
June 11, 2018).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). This section of the statute states:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
3. Id.
4. See Darrel R. VanDeusen & Alexander P. Berg, VanDeusen and Berg on The Developing
Law of LGBT Protections under Title VII, LEXISNEXIS (June 3, 2016), https://
www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/archive/2016/06/02/the-developing-
law-of-lgbt-protections-under-title-vii.aspx.
5. Based on expressio unius est exclusion alterius, a rule of statutory construction that follows
the notion that the inclusion of one term in a list of terms signals the exclusion of terms that are
not listed.
69
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Fifty-four years after its enactment, courts are still grappling with
the reach of Title VII’s protected traits. Existing caselaw demonstrates
the ambiguity surrounding Title VII and the scope of its prohibited
conduct.6 Within recent years, the federal courts have offered conflict-
ing interpretations of the enumerated term “sex” and its connection to
sexual orientation, which has led to a split between two federal appel-
late courts.7 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Title
VII’s express protection against discrimination on the basis of sex can-
not be interpreted broadly to extend to situations where the discrimi-
nation occurs on the basis of sexual orientation.8 However, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has found that Title VII’s express
protection against sex discrimination extends to such situations.9
This Comment argues that other federal courts should adopt the
Seventh Circuit’s decision to interpret Title VII coverage broadly to
include claims of sexual orientation discrimination as a basis for a
cause of action. Part II provides background information on (1) Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (2) the evolution of Title VII
through legislative history and prominent case precedent, and (3) the
current split between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits regarding
whether Title VII’s protection against sex discrimination in the work-
place includes sexual orientation discrimination. Part III offers an
analysis of the arguments set forth by the two appellate courts and a
proposal to embrace the Seventh Circuit’s ruling as the most appropri-
ate reading of Title VII because it best supports evolving Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Part IV discusses the impact the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s approach will have on employees, employers, and overall work-
place environments. It continues by recognizing the Seventh Circuit’s
power to shift the manner in which employment harassment and dis-
crimination claims are dealt with in regards to the lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, and transgender (LGBTQ) community.10 Lastly, Part V concludes
6. See generally Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017); Hively v. Ivy Tech
Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
7. See Catherine Foti, Will Sexual Orientation Finally Be a Protected Class?, FORBES (Apr. 10,
2017, 5:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/04/10/will-sexual-orientation-finally-
be-a-protected-class/#3ba6a9465ab9.
8. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255.
9. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
10. The LGBTQ initialism is continuously expanding to become more inclusive of under-
represented communities. It is said that the initialism has grown to “LGBTQQIAAP,” which
some argue is still not encompassing enough. We know what LGBT means but here’s what
LGBTQQIAAP stands for, BBC: NEWSBEAT (June 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/
article/33278165/we-know-what-lgbt-means-but-heres-what-lgbtqqiaap-stands-for. The expan-
sion of the LGBTQ initialism is “culturally and generationally driven” focused on embracing
diverse identities and sexualities. Bill Daley, Why LGBT initialism keeps growing, CHICAGO
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that the legislature should amend Title VII to mirror the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s interpretation by adopting the extension of the protection
against sex discrimination to include sexual orientation discrimination.
II. BACKGROUND
Historically, courts have struggled to determine the scope of the
protected traits enumerated in Title VII. Courts are hesitant to over-
turn caselaw to extend Title VII’s protections to traits not enumerated
in the statute.11 Such complexities have created a split in the federal
appellate courts regarding whether the landscape of Title VII should
be broadly read to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.12 Section A discusses the evolution of Title VII through legisla-
tive history and prominent caselaw. Section B delves into the recent
circuit split between the Eleventh Circuit in Evans v. Georgia Re-
gional Hospital and the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Commu-
nity College.
A. The Evolution of Title VII
This section chronicles the history behind Title VII. First, this sec-
tion provides a general overview of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with
respect to Title VII. Second, it analyzes the legislative activity that laid
the foundation for Title VII’s enactment. Third, it discusses the most
relevant and influential cases for the interpretation of the Title VII
debate.
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against their employees due to “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”13 Title VII operates solely within the employ-
ment realm, covering everything from hiring and firing practices to
training and compensation.14 All government agencies, and private
business employers overseeing fifteen or more employees, are subject
TRIBUNE (June 2, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/sc-lgbtqia-letters-
meaning-family-0606-20170602-story.html.
11. See, e.g., Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (“Because Congress has not made sexual orientation a
protected class, the appropriate venue for pressing the argument raised by the Commission and
the dissent is before Congress, not this Court.”).
12. Foti, supra note 7.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
14. Sex-Based Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://
www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Sex-Based
Discrimination].
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to the Act’s provisions.15 However, employers that discriminate on the
basis of religion, sex, or national origin are not in violation of Title VII
where the trait is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business.”16 This
exception is only available where employers can prove that the job
duties necessary to an employer’s primary business function cannot be
successfully performed due to the employee’s discriminated trait.17
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) and
some state and local Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs)
are responsible for enforcing Title VII.18
2. Legislative History
What constitutes “sex” for the purposes of Title VII? Congress has
yet to define the term’s reach. The 88th Congress enacted Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to promote equal employment opportuni-
ties for minorities and to provide the EEOC with a basis to investigate
complaints concerning workplace discrimination.19 The term “sex”
was added to Title VII’s enumerated, protected traits only one day
before the statute was approved by the House of Representatives.20
The term’s addition was due to a last-minute suggestion by Judge
Howard Smith, a Virginia Democrat, in an attempt to block a vote on
the statute.21 The National Woman’s Party, an organization integral to
the fight for women’s equality at the time,22 approached Judge Smith
and implored him to request the term’s addition to the Civil Rights
Bill, specifically to Title VII.23
Although he vowed that he sincerely supported the fight for gender
equality, Judge Smith was a staunch Southerner who vehemently op-
posed the civil rights movement and racial integration.24 Judge Smith
hoped that the addition of the term “sex” to the statue would prolong
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2012).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).
17. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Notably, race and color are not
enumerated, protected traits that fall within the exception; however, an employer’s religious
preference is not sufficient to qualify for the bona fide occupational qualification. See generally
EEOC Comm’n v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop’s Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).
18. Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPOR-
TUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
19. 110 CONG. REC. 2577–84 (1964).
20. Id.
21. Louis Menand, How Women Got In On The Civil Rights Act, NEW YORKER (July 21,
2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/21/sex-amendment.
22. See Our Mission, NAT’L WOMAN’S PARTY, https://www.nationalwomansparty.org/mission-
1 (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
23. Menand, supra note 21.
24. Menand, supra note 21.
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the statute’s deliberations, making it more difficult to pass and ulti-
mately resulting in its demise.25 However, Judge Smith’s efforts to
sabotage the statute ironically led to the passing of a more expansive
statute.26 During deliberations on the addition of the term “sex,”
Judge Smith satirically read aloud a letter he received from a woman
that addressed the polar inequalities between men and women.27 The
reading of the letter was met with laughter and comments by other
male representatives who joked that, when speaking with their wives,
their last words are usually, “Yes, dear.”28 The attitude toward the
“sex” amendment turned when Congresswoman Martha Griffiths
quipped that “[i]f there had been any necessity to have pointed out
that women were a second-class sex, the laughter would have proved
it.”29
Due to the term’s unusually late addition, the amendment was given
no committee hearing and was hastily agreed to by a head count vote
of 168 to 133.30 The term “sex” is traditionally defined as the biologi-
cal and physical traits that differentiate males and females.31 There is
nothing in the nine pages of the record concerning the discussion of
the amendment that suggests the legislators contemplated the scope of
the “sex amendment.”32 The record shows that the only concern con-
templated by the legislators with respect to the amendment’s addition
was the amendment’s capacity to protect white women who were
competing with men and racial minorities for employment.33
Because so little guidance exists as to what constitutes “sex” under
Title VII, much uncertainty surrounds the term’s reach. There have
been several attempts by the legislature to amend Title VII to expand
the enumerated term.34 The first attempt to amend was made in 1975
25. Menand, supra note 21.
26. Menand, supra note 21.
27. Menand, supra note 21.
28. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler); Menand, supra note 21.
29. 110 CONG. REC. at 2578 (statement of Rep. Griffiths); Menand, supra note 21.
30. 110 CONG. REC. at 2584.
31. Definitions Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity in APA Documents, AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2017) [hereinafter Definitions].
32. 110 CONG. REC. at 2579–80.
33. Id. at 2579 (statement of Rep. Griffiths) (“[Y]ou are going to have white men in one
bracket, you are going to try to take colored men and colored women and give them equal
employment rights, and down at the bottom of the list is going to be a white woman with no
rights at all.”).
34. See generally Joanna L. Grossman, Based on Sex: The EEOC Rules That Sexual Orienta-
tion Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination, JUSTIA (July 21, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/
07/21/based-on-sex-the-eeoc-rules-that-sexual-orientation-discrimination-is-sex-discrimination.
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and proposed adding the words “affectional or sexual preference.”35
However, the proposed amendment was not considered by the Judici-
ary Committee.36 All legislative attempts since have been similarly fu-
tile,37 allowing the uncertainty to persist in the eyes of the courts.38
3. Prominent Case History
Despite the fact that the enacting Congress “may not have envi-
sioned”39 the sex amendment to extend beyond the protection of
white women and the fact that legislative attempts to amend Title VII
have been unsuccessful,40 existing case precedent may be illustrative
of an evolving judicial landscape regarding what constitutes “sex” dis-
crimination under Title VII.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, federal courts were steadfast in
their refusal to acknowledge that sex could refer to anything other
than a man or a woman.41 Many courts were firm in their belief that,
because “[n]o mention is made of change of sex or of sexual prefer-
ence in the text of Title VII,”42 such claims could not be brought un-
less prompted by Congress.43 However, in the past twenty years, the
U.S. Supreme Court has issued two landmark decisions that have
stretched these traditional contours of Title VII’s protection against
sex discrimination.44
The first landmark decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
presented the Supreme Court with the question of whether employ-
35. Civil Rights Amendments, H.R. 166, 94th Cong. (1975). The amendment proposed that
the words “affectional or sexual preference” be applied to the contexts of “public accommoda-
tions, public education, equal employment opportunities, the sale, rental and financing of hous-
ing, and education programs which receive Federal financial assistance.” Id. However, the
prohibition on sex discrimination was only proscribed under Title VII. Such discrimination was
not outlawed by any other Title within the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Perhaps the abrupt, exten-
sive expansion of the amendment’s applicable contexts was problematic and hindered the
amendment’s passage in the employment context.
36. Id. See also Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 110-406, 110th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2007).
37. For similar attempts to amend, see H.R. 230 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 427 98th Cong.
(1983); H.R. 1454 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 2074 96th Cong. (1979).
38. Grossman, supra note 34.
39. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 13 (EEOC July 15, 2015), https://
www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf. See also I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation)
and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1167 (1991).
40. 110 CONG. REC. 2583 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith).
41. VanDeusen & Berg, supra note 4, at 3.
42. VanDeusen & Berg, supra note 4, at 3 (quoting Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403
F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff’d, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978)).
43. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984).
44. See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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ment discrimination on the basis of noncompliance with sex stereo-
types qualified under Title VII as sex discrimination.45 Hopkins, a
businesswoman, was criticized by her male colleagues for being
“macho” and for failing to “walk more femininely, talk more femi-
ninely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry.”46 The Supreme Court ruled that discrimination on
the basis of sex stereotyping qualified as sex discrimination because
“an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gen-
der.”47 The Court notably stated that “gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions.”48 In response to the decision in Price
Waterhouse, some courts have adopted a broad reading that allows
homosexual individuals to bring similar gender stereotyping claims
under Title VII if the individuals can “demonstrate that they were
treated adversely because they were viewed—based on their appear-
ance, mannerisms, or conduct—as insufficiently ‘masculine’ or ‘femi-
nine.’”49 Thus, discrimination on the basis that an employee strayed
from his or her respective gender expectations is akin to discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex.50
In the second landmark decision, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, the Supreme Court found that sexual harassment by another
individual of the same sex qualifies as sexual harassment under Title
VII.51 In Oncale, a male employee was verbally and physically bullied
by his male coworkers.52 The Court reasoned that “nothing in Title
VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’
merely because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same
sex.”53 The decision made it clear that an offender’s sex in comparison
to that of a victim’s is inconsequential because Title VII serves to pro-
tect both men and women.54 Both Price Waterhouse and Oncale were
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228.
46. Id. at 232–35.
47. Id. at 250.
48. Id. at 240.
49. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 9 (EEOC July 15, 2015), https://
www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf (citing Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 574
(6th Cir. 2004)); see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017)
(en banc); EEOC v. Boh Brothers, 731 F.3d 444, 459–60 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
50. VanDeusen & Berg, supra note 4, at 5–6.
51. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
52. Id. at 77.
53. Id. at 79.
54. Id.
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significant steps towards expanding the definition of “sex” under Title
VII.55
There are a number of other Supreme Court cases that have con-
tributed to the foundation for a broader reading of Title VII’s protec-
tions. For instance, the Oncale decision was based on the Supreme
Court’s earlier holding in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. In Meritor
Savings Bank, the Court determined that sexual harassment is action-
able under Title VII’s protection against sex discrimination.56
Although not a case brought pursuant to Title VII, the Supreme
Court took a prominent stand in Loving v. Virginia by reversing state
bans on interracial marriages, stating that such laws violate the Equal
Protection Clause.57 The Court found that discrimination on the basis
of association with a different race qualified as race discrimination.58
Some courts have extended the holding in Loving to the employment
realm.59 These courts have reasoned that, when an employer discrimi-
nates against an employee for dating or marrying someone of another
race, Title VII has been violated on the basis of race discrimination.60
Another prominent case that does not directly consider Title VII,
but that some courts have recognized may assist in the interpretation
of Title VII, is Obergefell v. Hodges.61 In Obergefell, the Supreme
Court ruled that same-sex couples’ right to marry is protected by the
Constitution’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause.62
This decision followed United States v. Windsor, in which the Court
took a preliminary step toward the holding in Obergefell by quashing
a statute that confined marriage to heterosexual couples.63
55. Masako Kanazawa, Note, Schwenk and the Ambiguity in Federal “Sex” Discrimination
Jurisprudence: Defining Sex Discrimination Dynamically under Title VII, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
255, 262 (2001).
56. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
57. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008); Drake v. Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 1998); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888
(11th Cir. 1986).
60. See, e.g., Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 132; Drake, 134 F.3d at 881, 883–84; Parr, 791 F.2d at
890–91.
61. Dale Carpenter, Seventh Circuit holds that Title VII forbids anti-gay job discrimination,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/04/seventh-circuit-holds-that-title-vii-forbids-anti-gay-job-discrim-
ination/?utm_term=.b7ffb504f30c.
62. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
63. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013).
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In recent years, the EEOC, which is the primary agency for enforc-
ing Title VII,64 has publicly announced its support of the view that
sexual orientation discrimination qualifies as a subset of sex discrimi-
nation.65 For example, the EEOC, in its capacity to make federal sec-
tor appellate decisions, held in Baldwin v. Foxx that sex
discrimination subsumes sexual orientation discrimination.66 In so
holding, the EEOC rationalized:
(1) sexual orientation discrimination necessarily involves treating
workers less favorably because of their sex because sexual orienta-
tion as a concept cannot be understood without reference to sex; (2)
sexual orientation discrimination is rooted in non-compliance with
sex stereotypes and gender norms, and employment decisions based
in such stereotypes and norms have long been found to be prohib-
ited sex discrimination under Title VII; and (3) sexual orientation
discrimination punishes workers because of their close personal as-
sociation with members of a particular sex, such as marital and
other personal relationships.67
Less than one year after its holding in Baldwin, the EEOC filed its
first sex discrimination lawsuit based on sexual orientation discrimina-
tion under Title VII in United States EEOC v. Scott Medical Health
Center.68 The EEOC successfully asserted an argument that mirrored
the explanation of its holding in Baldwin.69
Due to the fact that Congress has refrained from defining the land-
scape of what constitutes sex discrimination, courts have historically
been hesitant to overextend the scope of Title VII’s enumerated
terms. Nevertheless, federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
have set precedent which may lend itself to future expansion of sex
discrimination that is prohibited under Title VII.
64. What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Work-
ers, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/
enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
65. Jay-Anne B. Casuga, EEOC Will Hold Ground on Sexual Orientation Protection, BLOOM-
BERG LAW (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.bna.com/eeoc-hold-ground-n73014462739/.
66. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 13 (EEOC July 15, 2015), https://
www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf.
67. Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Federal Court Issues Historic Ruling
in EEOC Lawsuit: Civil Rights Act of 1964 Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination (Nov. 7,
2016), https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/11-9-16.cfm?renderforprint=1.
68. 217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 835 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that “discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is a subset of sexual stereotyping and thus covered by Title VII’s prohibitions
on discrimination ‘because of sex’”).
69. Id. at 839.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-1\DPL105.txt unknown Seq: 10  7-JAN-19 10:04
78 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:69
B. The Current Circuit Split
This section examines the conflicting outcomes in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit ruling in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, and the Seventh
Circuit ruling in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College.70 Both cases
evaluated the same question: whether employment discrimination
claims on the basis of sexual orientation can be brought under Title
VII.71 The Eleventh Circuit held that such a protection does not exist
within the scope of Title VII, relying heavily on existing precedent as
the basis for its finding.72 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit, en
banc, boldly overturned existing precedent in finding that such a pro-
tection does exist under Title VII.73
1. Eleventh Circuit’s Narrow Reading of Sex Discrimination Under
Title VII
Evans involved a lesbian woman, Jameka Evans, who alleged dis-
crimination based on her sexual orientation and gender non-conform-
ity.74 Evans accused her former employer, Georgia Regional Hospital,
her two supervisors, and a Senior Human Resources Manager of dis-
crimination under Title VII.75 For over a year, Evans worked as a se-
curity officer at Georgia Regional Hospital, during which time her
supervisors allegedly discriminated against her in several ways, includ-
ing disrupting her work schedule, promoting less-qualified employees,
and tampering with her uniform.76 Although Evans disclosed her sex-
uality to one supervisor when directly asked, her sexuality was said to
be “evident” due to the manner in which she presented herself as well
as other outward indicators that suggested she did not conform to gen-
der stereotypes.77
The Eleventh Circuit was concerned with the scope of Title VII’s
prohibited discriminatory conduct and its application to a class not
enumerated in the statute’s protected traits. The defendants con-
tended that employment discrimination claims on the basis of sexual
70. See generally Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017); Hively v. Ivy Tech
Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
71. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255; Hively, 853 F.3d at 343. See also J. Dalton Courson, Circuits Split
on Interpretations of Title VII and Sexual-Orientation-Based Claims, ABA (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/civil-rights/practice/2018/circuits-split-
on-interpretations-of-title-vii-and-sexual-orientation-based-claims/.
72. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
73. Hively, 853 F.3d at 351.
74. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250.
75. Id. at 1250–51.
76. Id. at 1251.
77. Id. (stating that Evans wore a “male uniform, low male haircut, shoes, etc.”).
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orientation are not actionable under Title VII and, therefore, the
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim sua sponte was proper.78 Evans
argued that sexual orientation discrimination is equivalent to sex dis-
crimination for purposes of Title VII claims and that she was discrimi-
nated against for failing to conform to gender stereotypes.79 Evans’s
objections were supported by the Lambda Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, Inc. (Lambda Legal), which filed an amicus curiae brief on
her behalf.80 Lambda Legal argued that “an employee’s status as les-
bian, gay, bisexual or transgender (‘LGBT’), does not defeat a claim
based on gender non-conformity.”81
After considering the arguments made by both parties, a divided
panel held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimi-
nation.82 To reach this conclusion, the court examined the applicabil-
ity of a string of past cases. The court determined that existing
precedent in the Eleventh Circuit did not allow the panel to find in
favor of allowing sexual orientation discrimination to be prohibited
under Title VII, explaining that “binding precedent forecloses such an
action.”83
First, the court addressed its holding in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., in
which the court stated that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not pro-
hibited by Title VII . . . .”84 The court rejected the EEOC’s argument
that this statement is not controlling because mere dicta is not binding
precedent.85 The court found that the structure surrounding the lan-
guage suggested that the statement was not dicta. Instead, the court
urged that just because a rationale is an alternative rationale does not
make it any less binding on the issue before the court.86
Next, the court addressed two Supreme Court decisions, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.87 The Evans court noted that other circuits may interpret these
two cases as supporting sexual orientation discrimination claims under
Title VII.88 However, the court found that neither case compelled a
departure from Blum because neither was “on point nor contrary to
78. Id. at 1256–58.
79. Id. at 1253.
80. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1252–53.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1256–57.
83. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255.
84. Id. (citing Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1255–56 (quoting Hitchcock v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 745 F.3d 476, 485 (11th Cir.
2014) (“[A]n alternative holding is not dicta but instead is binding precedent.”)).
87. Id. at 1256.
88. Id. at 1257.
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Blum.”89 Because the Supreme Court decisions in Price Waterhouse
and Oncale were not clearly on point, they did not override the deci-
sion the Eleventh Circuit previously made in Blum.90
Accordingly, the court disregarded Evans’s objection in light of
Blum and a line of cases heard by sister circuits, which all reached the
conclusion that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.91 Thus, Evans’s employment discrimination
claim under Title VII on the basis of sexual orientation was dismissed,
and her claim that she was discriminated against for non-conformance
to gender stereotypes was remanded.92
Lambda Legal petitioned for the court to rehear the case en banc.93
Several members of Congress and women’s rights groups filed mo-
tions for permission to file amicus curiae briefs in support of Evans.94
However, the Eleventh Circuit recently denied the petition, closing
the opportunity to reconsider the 2–1 ruling.95
2. Seventh Circuit’s Broad Reading of Sex Discrimination Under
Title VII
By contrast, in a case with similar facts, the Seventh Circuit ruled
that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination,” and therefore, is a proper cause of action under Title
VII.96 In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, a lesbian woman,
Kimberly Hively, alleged she was being discriminated against by her
89. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
90. Id. (citing Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While an intervening
decision of the Supreme Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our court, the Su-
preme Court decision must be clearly on point.”)).
91. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. In-
come Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305
F.3d 1061, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2002); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d
Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. &
Health Care, 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of
Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259
(1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989).
92. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256–58.
93. Johanna G. Zelman et al., Eleventh Circuit Sets the Stage for U.S. Supreme Court Certifica-
tion on Whether Sexual Orientation is Protected by Title VII, LEXOLOGY (July 11, 2017), https://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-DB179c88-2330-4a22-96f9-e42734be7476.
94. Christine Powell, Lawmakers Want 11th Cir. To Rethink Sex Orientation Ruling, LAW360
(Apr. 11, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/911973/lawmakers-want-11th-circ-to-
rethink-sex-orientation-ruling.
95. Judy Greenwald, 11th Circuit won’t rehear Title VII ruling on sexual orientation, BUS. INS.
(July 7, 2017, 1:57 PM), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/00010101/NEWS06/
912314339/11th-Circuit-won%E2%80%99t-rehear-Title-VII-ruling-on-sexual-orientation.
96. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017).
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employer based on her sexual orientation.97 Hively was a part-time
professor at Ivy Tech Community College for fourteen years.98 After
nine years of being a part-time professor, she applied for a full-time
position and was rejected.99 Hively filed her employment discrimina-
tion complaint pursuant to Title VII with the District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana.100 Ivy Tech Community College, the de-
fendant, argued that claims based on sexual orientation discrimination
do not support a cause of action under Title VII.101
Initially, a Seventh Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s dismis-
sal of Hively’s case, but admitted it was forced to do so in light of
existing precedent. The court also recommended that the case be
reheard en banc.102 Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit granted the
rehearing and found that employment discrimination claims on the
basis of sexual orientation can be brought under Title VII.103 The
court reached this decision “[i]n light of the importance of the issue,
and recognizing the power of the full court to overrule earlier deci-
sions and to bring our law into conformity with the Supreme Court’s
teachings.”104
The court began by acknowledging that, despite numerous opportu-
nities to do so, Congress has not amended Title VII to expand the
classes of protected traits to include sexual orientation.105 To this, the
court responded that it would be “too difficult to draw a reliable infer-
ence from these truncated legislative initiatives to rest our opinion on
them.” Further, the court explained that Congress’s decision to use
the words “sexual orientation” in the Violence Against Women Act
and the Hate Crimes Act does not bar the possibility that sexual ori-
entation may be a subset of sex discrimination for purposes of Title
VII.106
Next, the court analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale
and stated that Title VII’s absence of the term “sexual orientation”
was inconsequential due to “the fact that the enacting Congress may






102. Mark Joseph Stern, A Thunderbolt From the 7th Circuit, SLATE (Apr. 5, 2017, 1:47 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/04/the_7th_circuit_rules_
that_anti_gay_employment_discrimination_is_illegal.html.
103. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 344.
106. Id.
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the way of the provisions of the law that are on the books.”107 The
court then stated that, from the time the statute was enacted fifty
years ago, Title VII has expanded to prohibit more discrimination
than what the plain language indicates.108
The court then discussed the comparative method of statutory inter-
pretation, which compares how Hively was actually treated by her em-
ployer to how Hively would have been treated by her employer when
only the variable of her sex is changed.109 In support, Hively argued
that there would be no adverse employment action with her dating a
woman if she were a man.110 The court looked at this comparison
“through the lens of gender non-conformity,” and stated that “Hively
represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stere-
otype.”111 The discriminatory conduct considers the individual’s sex at
the time of birth.112 Therefore, disapproval based on dress or same-
sex relationships is a reaction “based on sex.”113
Hively also argued that, under Loving v. Virginia, she had a right to
intimate association with another person.114 Courts have extended this
right to the employment discrimination context in that when an em-
ployer discriminates against an employee for marrying someone of an-
other race, Title VII is violated on the basis of race discrimination.115
The court explained that sexual orientation discrimination is similar
because, just as the change of one partner’s race would change the
outcome, the change of one partner’s sex would change the
outcome.116
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit used a “purposivism” approach117 to in-
terpret today’s law in light of the evolving authoritative landscape laid
107. Id. at 344–45.
108. Id. at 345 (“The Supreme Court has held that the prohibition against sex discrimination
reaches sexual harassment in the workplace, see Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
. . . (1986), including same-sex workplace harassment, see Oncale; it reaches discrimination based
on actuarial assumptions about a person’s longevity, see City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water and
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 . . . (1978); and it reaches discrimination based on a person’s
failure to conform to a certain set of gender stereotypes, see Hopkins.”).
109. In applying the comparative method, the court examined “whether the complainant’s
protected characteristic played a role in the adverse employment decision. The counterfactual
we must use is a situation in which Hively is a man, but everything else stays the same: in particu-
lar, the sex or gender of the partner.” Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 346.
112. Id. at 346–47.
113. Id. at 347.
114. Id. at 347 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
115. Hively, 853 F.3d at 347–48.
116. Id. at 349.
117. Broadly speaking, the purposivism approach to statutory interpretation aims to deter-
mine the legislature’s purpose. However, this is not to say that purposivists strive to determine
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out by the Supreme Court.118 Thus, an en banc Seventh Circuit over-
ruled its prior precedent,119 and ruled that discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is a sufficient cause of action under Title VII as a
subset of sex discrimination.120
The Seventh Circuit’s en banc ruling stands in stark contrast to that
of the Eleventh Circuit. In both cases, employment discrimination
claims on the basis of sexual orientation were brought under Title VII.
The Eleventh Circuit relied on existing precedent and found that such
claims cannot be brought under Title VII.121 The Seventh Circuit, on
the other hand, overruled existing precedent in keeping with the
evolving legal landscape and found that such claims can be brought
under Title VII.122 Such diverging opinions have major, but inconsis-
tent, impacts on discrimination within the employment sphere.
III. ANALYSIS
This section examines the distinct reasoning that led to the conflict-
ing holdings of the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits with respect to
whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation gives rise to
a cause of action under Title VII. First, this section analyzes the differ-
ences in the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits’ holdings. In doing so, this
section will consider the opposing statutory interpretations of the Sev-
enth and Eleventh Circuit, evolving caselaw, and policy considera-
tions. Finally, this section argues that the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation should be adopted due to its application of existing Su-
the legislature’s actual purpose. In identifying the legislature’s purpose under the purposivism
approach, purposivists remain receptive to policy considerations. The purposivism approach fol-
lows the idea that ambiguous words in a statute’s text should be resolved by examining the
word’s semantic use in consideration of the word’s “policy context.” See Richard H. Fallon Jr.,
Three Symmetries between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Stautory Interpretation—and
the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 704 (2014)
(quoting John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
91 (2006)) (“For purposivists, the relevant context for the interpretation of statutes is what Pro-
fessor Manning calls their ‘policy context,’ involving evidence of the demonstrable and likely
aims of the presumptively reasonable legislators who enacted a provision in the first place.”).
118. David Lat, A Judicial Battle Royal At The Seventh Circuit — And Judge Posner’s Favorite
Gays Of All Time, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 5, 2017, 3:28 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/04/a-
judicial-battle-royal-at-the-seventh-circuit-and-judge-posners-favorite-gays-of-all-time/?rf=1.
119. See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003); Spear-
man v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. &
Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty.
Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir.
1984).
120. Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52.
121. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017).
122. Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-1\DPL105.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-JAN-19 10:04
84 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:69
preme Court caselaw and appropriate consideration of society’s evolv-
ing acceptance of same-sex relationships.
A. Hallmark Differences Between the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit
Opinions
The Eleventh and Seventh Circuit Courts similarly addressed sev-
eral topics in their opinions when contemplating whether sexual orien-
tation discrimination is a cause of action under Title VII. This section
discusses the central topics and breaks down the arguments with re-
spect to both circuit courts. First, this section examines the manner in
which both circuit courts interpreted the language of Title VII and the
rationale for its enactment. Second, this section discusses the relevant
caselaw both the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits considered in their
opinions and assesses the manner in which those cases were applied.
Lastly, this section examines several policy considerations that both
circuit courts considered in ruling as they did.
1. Opposing Statutory Interpretations in the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits
The Eleventh and Seventh Circuits presented directly opposing
views of how Title VII’s grant of protection against sex discrimination
should be interpreted. The Eleventh Circuit determined that Title
VII’s enumerated term “sex” does not include protection against sex-
ual orientation discrimination.123 On the other hand, the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated that “sex” should be broadly read to include sexual
orientation discrimination.124 The reason behind these opposing views
can be attributed to the courts’ differing opinions on the scope of judi-
cial power to interpret such language.125
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Title VII’s language as narrowly
as possible. The court explained that Congress did not intend for Title
VII to protect homosexual individuals126 because the plain meaning of
“sex” as Congress intended it refers to biological and physical traits
rather than sexual attraction.127 Therefore, Title VII cannot now be
interpreted in a manner that would allow such protection.128 In his
123. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
124. Hively, 853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017).
125. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 343–46; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
126. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261.
127. Definitions, supra note 31; Sex-Based Discrimination, supra note 14.
128. Mark Joseph Stern, 11th Circuit Rules Title VII Does Not Prohibit Anti-Gay Discrimina-
tion in Deeply Confused Opinion, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2017, 6:47 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
outward/2017/03/10/_11th_circuit_rules_title_vii_does_not_prohibit_anti_gay_discrimination.
html.
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concurrence, Judge William Pryor, who also authored the majority
opinion, stated that “[b]ecause Congress has not made sexual orienta-
tion a protected class, the appropriate venue for pressing the argu-
ment raised by the Commission and the dissent is before Congress,
not this Court.”129
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit adopted a broader, more
progressive approach in finding that sex discrimination also embodies
sexual orientation discrimination.130 Rather than following the Elev-
enth Circuit’s interpretation of the issue as calling for an unauthorized
amendment to Title VII, the Seventh Circuit confronted the issue by
reading sex discrimination to include sexual orientation discrimina-
tion. Judge Diane Wood, writing for the majority, wrote “[w]e must
decide instead what it means to discriminate on the basis of sex, and in
particular, whether actions taken on the basis of sexual orientation are
a subset of actions taken on the basis of sex.”131 Judge Wood further
stated that this “is a pure question of statutory interpretation and thus
well within the judiciary’s competence.”132 The Seventh Circuit ac-
knowledged that the inclusion of sexual orientation was likely not the
intent of the legislature at the time of Title VII’s enactment133 and not
an unexpressed yet intrinsic feature of the statute’s language.134 In-
stead, the Seventh Circuit found that the judiciary has the power to
interpret statutes in a way that gives “fresh meaning”135 to a statute’s
language.136 Judge Wood pointed out that just as the meaning of con-
stitutional provisions has been interpreted to reflect cultural shifts, so
too, may statutes be interpreted.137
129. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring).
130. Hively, 853 F.3d at 351.
131. Id. at 342.
132. Id. at 343.
133. Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 352.
136. Hively, 853 F.3d at 353. The concurring opinion reads in relevant part: “Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, now more than half a century old, invites an interpretation that will
update it to the present, a present that differs markedly from the era in which the Act was
enacted.” Id.
137. Id. One hallmark constitutional provision that has been interpreted to reflect cultural
developments is the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Technological advance-
ments in police surveillance are a way the Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures has been reinterpreted to keep up with cultural changes. Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding the seizure of cell-site location data consti-
tutes a search, acknowledging that technological shifts have altered the traditional concept of
privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which are given to telephone companies).
Another hallmark constitutional provision that courts have reinterpreted is the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment was originally directed at prevent-
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The Eleventh Circuit viewed the case as requiring an amendment
by construction, which is the role of the legislature rather than the
judiciary. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit took the opportunity to read
sexual orientation into Title VII’s existing language.
2. Evolving Caselaw
The law has seen much change since the enactment of Title VII in
1964. Title VII jurisprudence has recognized many forms of discrimi-
nation that were not originally enumerated in the statute.138 Despite
the Supreme Court’s absence from the sex discrimination interpreta-
tion debate, the Court has laid a foundation through several promi-
nent decisions that enables courts to interpret sex discrimination.139 In
this respect, the difference between the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit
rulings surrounds the question of whether or not two seminal deci-
sions, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Servs., Inc., indirectly support a finding of a cause of action
based on sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII. The Elev-
enth Circuit ignored the influence of these cases, arguing that they are
not direct authority, instead choosing to strictly adhere to its own case
precedent.140 The Seventh Circuit decided that both cases indepen-
dently supported the court’s ruling that sex discrimination under Title
VII encompasses sexual orientation discrimination.141
Sticking to its narrow interpretation of Title VII’s plain language,
the Eleventh Circuit in Evans similarly interpreted the influence of
ancillary court precedent. The court found that Price Waterhouse and
Oncale do not support a finding that sexual orientation discrimination
ing discrimination against African Americans; however, it has since been read expansively to
protect other races, nationalities, and groups of people. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374
(1886).
To bring the reinterpretation of constitutional provisions in line with the reinterpretation of
statutory provisions, Judge Posner in his concurring opinion lists the Sherman Antitrust Act as
an example of a statute that has been reinterpreted to reflect the needs of a modernized society.
Hively, 853 F.3d at 352. He states that the Act was enacted “long before there was a sophisti-
cated understanding of the economics of monopoly and competition.” Id. Since the Act was
enacted in 1980, the law of economics, business practices, and technology has evolved drastically.
Id. The Act has since been updated through judicial reinterpretation to accommodate effective
regulation of a more advanced marketplace. Id.
138. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75,
82 (1998) (finding that same-sex sexual harassment qualifies as sexual harassment under Title
VII); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (finding that sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination).
139. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75; Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
140. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2017).
141. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342.
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is included in Title VII’s protections.142 The court explained that the
decisions “do not squarely address whether sexual orientation dis-
crimination is prohibited by Title VII”143 and therefore, are inapplica-
ble to the present case. The court acknowledged that other courts may
extend their decisions in favor of finding the contrary;144 however, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that it was bound by its own precedent.145
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit found it was barred from ruling
otherwise.146
The precedent the Eleventh Circuit purports to be bound by is
Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,147 a case from 1979 that the Eleventh Circuit’s
“predecessor court” decided.148 The Blum court stated in relevant
part that the “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title
VII.”149 However, the Blum court failed to provide an analysis to sup-
port the contention. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision to be strictly
bound by Blum was the deciding factor in the Evans case. Because
Supreme Court precedent was “neither clearly on point nor contrary
to Blum,” the Eleventh Circuit deemed itself bound by its existing
precedent.150
The Seventh Circuit, however, took a step in the other direction.151
Having not previously addressed the issue, the Seventh Circuit had
the ability to overturn the existing Title VII precedent.152 In conclud-
ing that sexual orientation should be read into Title VII’s protection
against sex discrimination, the court found support in Supreme Court
precedent.
First, the court discussed Price Waterhouse, in which an employer
violated Title VII on the basis of sex stereotyping (or gender non-
conformity) when he denied a female employee a promotion because
she dressed in a masculine fashion.153 The Seventh Circuit analogized
142. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1257. The opinion reads in relevant part:
Whether those Supreme Court cases impact other circuit’s decisions, many of which
were decided after Price Waterhouse and Oncale, does not change our analysis that
Blum is binding precedent that has not been overruled by a clearly contrary opinion of
the Supreme Court or of this Court sitting en banc.
Id.
145. Id. at 1256.
146. Id. at 1256–57.
147. 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).
148. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1270 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part).
149. Blum, 597 F.2d at 938.
150. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
151. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
152. Id.
153. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 a 228, 232–35 (1989).
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the Hively case to Price Waterhouse by explaining that discriminating
against homosexual individuals for not being attracted to the opposite
sex is the same as discriminating against heterosexual individuals for
not conforming to the respective sex’s stereotype.154 The Seventh Cir-
cuit explained that lesbian women, for example, represent “the ulti-
mate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype.”155
Accordingly, employment decisions that are based on the failure to
dress the way one’s respective sex is expected to dress is no different
from employment decisions that are based on the failure to date or
marry a member of the opposite sex.156 Under the Seventh Circuit’s
view, both of these employer decisions constitute disapprovals of an
individual’s behavior based on sex.157
Second, the Seventh Circuit relied on Oncale, which permitted a
cause of action for same-sex harassment.158 Such an action was neither
originally enumerated in Title VII, nor was it evident that Congress
had intended to include the protection. However, the Seventh Circuit
found this to be inconsequential.159 The Seventh Circuit stated that
“the fact that Congress may not have anticipated a particular applica-
tion of the law cannot stand in the way of the provisions of the law
that are on the books.”160 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the com-
bination of Price Waterhouse and Oncale represented the Supreme
Court’s sanction of a departure from the traditional view of sex dis-
crimination under Title VII.161
Third, the Seventh Circuit in Hively went further and discussed two
hallmark marriage cases, Loving and Obergefell. Judge Wood first
dove into a Loving analysis, or “comparative method” analysis, by iso-
lating the one factor in dispute.162 The Supreme Court in Obergefell
applied the comparative method analysis to same-sex relationships.163
Thus, the Hively court found it appropriate to apply this analysis to
same-sex relationships in the employment context.164 In Loving, the
Court dealt with race. Thus, the Hively court replaced race with sex,
keeping all other factors constant.165 The court asked whether, “hold-




158. Id. at 346 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
159. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 342–45.
162. Id. at 345.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
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ing all other things constant and changing only her sex, [Hively] would
have been treated the same way?”166 Because the court answered this
question in the negative, the court concluded Hively had in fact been
discriminated against because of her sex.167
3. Policy Considerations
As with most circuit court decisions, both the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits addressed policy considerations as they relate to traditional
rules of statutory interpretation. One argument against the inclusion
of sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination under Title
VII is that such an action by the judiciary would be outside the scope
of its authority, raising a separation of powers concern. Finding that
sexual orientation discrimination is included within sex discrimination
would represent an overstepping by the judiciary, crossing the bound-
ary into the territory of legislative authority. This is exactly the argu-
ment that the Eleventh Circuit adopted. In his concurrence, Judge
Pryor insisted that reading sexual orientation discrimination as sex
discrimination would be an abuse of judicial power.168 Doing so would
require amending Title VII, which is within the confines of legislative
authority, not judicial authority.169 Judge Pryor’s preferred approach
was to tread lightly in interpreting legislation because otherwise the
result could be the blurring of separation of powers and the establish-
ment of inappropriate precedent.
The Seventh Circuit gave more consideration to the case’s potential
social consequences. In his concurrence, Judge Posner recognized that
there comes a time when statutes become so outdated that in order to
understand the change of a statute’s meaning, it must be read with
cultural and political shifts in mind.170 Judge Posner noted that the
Supreme Court’s decision to legalize same-sex marriage in Obergefell
reflects the nation’s social direction.171 Furthermore, the Seventh Cir-
cuit considered the practicality of its decision in light of Obergefell.
The court realized that “a person can be married on Saturday and
then fired on Monday for just that act.”172 To remedy this inconsis-
tency, the Seventh Circuit disregarded existing precedent and read
sexual orientation discrimination into sex discrimination. In doing so,
the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that present Title VII jurispru-
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. Hively, 853 F.3d at 353 (Posner, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 354–55 (Posner, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 342.
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dence, in combination with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell, creates “bizarre results” and “a paradoxical legal
landscape.”173
B. The Strength of the Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation
This section argues that the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Title
VII is the most appropriate reading of the statutory language based on
the court’s application of evolving Supreme Court jurisprudence and
consideration of society’s changing attitude toward same-sex
relationships.
Recent studies have shown that a record number of people are in-
volved in same-sex relationships.174 Overall, society has become far
more accepting of same-sex relationships.175 Perhaps the most promi-
nent confirmation of this acceptance is the Supreme Court’s decision
in 2015 to recognize that same-sex couples have a fundamental right
to marriage.176 Society’s reaction to the decision was generally posi-
tive.177 The case legitimizes and protects same-sex relationships; men
can now legally marry other men and women can legally marry other
women.178 However, the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Evans
undermines the stability and execution of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Obergefell. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Title
VII, men and women can be discriminated against at their jobs for
marrying a person of the same sex, an act both men and women have
a legal right to undertake. Yet, potential claimants will not have any
legal recourse available to them to remedy the wrongful discrimina-
tion they experienced because the Eleventh Circuit does not recognize
sexual orientation discrimination as a basis for a Title VII claim. Cir-
cuit splits inherently create inconsistency in the law, and the Eleventh
Circuit’s recent decision in Evans creates an inconsistent and unpre-
dictable legal patchwork of same-sex rights.
In addition to its negative impact on same-sex rights, the Eleventh
Circuit’s ruling in Evans was not well supported. The Eleventh Circuit
173. Id.
174. Jean M. Twenge, Why We’re Having More Same-Sex Relationships Than Ever, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (June 1, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/our-changing-culture/201606/why-
were-having-more-same-sex-relationships-ever (citing Jean M. Twenge et al., Changes in Ameri-
can Adults’ Reported Same-Sex Sexual Experiences and Attitudes, 1973–2014, 45 ARCHIVES SEX-
UAL BEHAV. 1713 (2016)).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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relied on precedent in Blum, which was established almost forty years
ago.179 Notably, Blum was decided ten years before the Supreme
Court decided the landmark same-sex stereotyping case, Price
Waterhouse.180 In her dissent, Judge Rosenbaum made an excellent
point when she mentioned that Price Waterhouse’s succeeding deci-
sion effectively “abrogated” the precedent established by Blum, which
the majority relied on.181 In light of recent caselaw developments, the
Eleventh Circuit had an opportunity to redefine same-sex rights. In-
stead, the court stated this was a job more properly suited for Con-
gress.182 However, interpreting statutes is well within a circuit court’s
judicial authority.183
It is true that there currently exists no Supreme Court precedent
directly on point to provide guidance to the circuit courts. However,
the Eleventh Circuit’s disregard for Supreme Court same-sex and Ti-
tle VII jurisprudence is difficult to overlook. The Eleventh Circuit
stated that current Supreme Court precedent does not directly decide
whether sexual orientation discrimination constitutes a proper cause
of action under Title VII.184 In his concurrence, Judge Pryor further
explained that Price Waterhouse addressed “behavior, not status.”185
Status alone does not trigger Title VII’s protections.186
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse, however, read sex stere-
otyping into Title VII’s cause of action for sex discrimination.187 The
Seventh Circuit makes a stronger argument than the Eleventh Circuit
in its finding that when an employee has been discriminated against by
an employer based on the employee’s failure to conform to gender
stereotypes, the employer has discriminated on the basis of sex.188 The
gender stereotype the employer bases the discrimination on is the fail-
ure to conform to heteronormativity.189 Although sexual orientation
may be a status, as recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, it may also
179. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1261–65 (11th Cir. 2017) (“‘Simply put, Price
Waterhouse requires us to apply the rule that ‘[a]n individual cannot be punished because of his
or her perceived gender-nonconformity.’ Since continued application of Blum would allow a
woman to be punished precisely because of her perceived gender non-conformity—in this case,
sexual attraction to other women—Price Waterhouse undermines these cases to the point of
abrogation.”).
180. Id. at 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
184. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
185. Id. at 1259 (Pryor, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 1260.
187. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
188. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
189. Id.
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constitute a behavior in that a homosexual individual fails to behave
in conformance with a respective gender’s stereotype.190 Among other
things, being attracted to, dating, or marrying a member of the same
sex can constitute a behavior for purposes of Price Waterhouse and its
application to sexual orientation discrimination.191
Although it can be said that when the 88th Congress enacted Title
VII it likely did not intend for sex discrimination to encompass sexual
orientation discrimination,192 Congress likely did not intend for sex
discrimination to include same-sex harassment, either.193 However,
the Supreme Court in Oncale permitted a cause of action for same-sex
harassment under Title VII.194 The Court stated that statutes must
sometimes be interpreted beyond the original intent of the legisla-
ture.195 The Seventh Circuit powerfully explained “the fact that the
enacting Congress may not have anticipated a particular application of
the law cannot stand in the way of the provisions of the law that are
on the books.”196 Congress’s failure to anticipate a specific meaning
should not prevent the statute from being textually interpreted as
such.197 This view is directly representative of the court’s progressive
and modern interpretation of Title VII to reflect current societal val-
ues, which Judge Posner coined “judicial interpretative updating.”198
In his concurrence, Judge Posner justified his modern take on inter-
preting statutory language by stating that Congress “shouldn’t be
blamed for that failure of foresight. We understand the words of Title
190. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1252 (recognizing sexual orientation as a status); Hively, 853 F.3d at
346–47.
191. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346–47 (discussing Price Waterhouse and employers’ use of stereo-
types about women to discriminate based on sex).
192. See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text.
193. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
194. Id.
195. Hively, 853 F.3d at 344 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80). The opinion reads in relevant
part:
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule
excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some courts
have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because
of . . . sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this in-
cludes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the
statutory requirements.
Id.
196. Id. at 345.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 353.
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VII differently not because we’re smarter than the statute’s framers
and ratifiers but because we live in a different era, a different cul-
ture.”199 As society evolves, so too must the law that governs it.
The Seventh Circuit’s approach does not overstep judicial authority
as the Eleventh Circuit posits. The Seventh Circuit reads sexual orien-
tation into same-sex stereotyping, which the Supreme Court has ruled
constitutes sex discrimination for the purpose of Title VII.200 Amend-
ing a statute requires the intervention of the legislature.201 Interpret-
ing a statute’s textual language, on the other hand, does not require an
amendment and, therefore, does not require the intervention of the
legislature.202 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit acted well within its
authority when it interpreted sex discrimination as encompassing sex-
ual orientation discrimination.203
The Seventh Circuit further supported its decision by relying on
other Supreme Court precedent, namely Loving.204 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision fails to address Loving in its entirety. Loving was an
inter-racial marriage case that supports a comparative method analy-
sis.205 The Seventh Circuit was correct in extending the comparative
method analysis to same-sex relationships within the employment
context.206 Just as the comparative method analysis would be appro-
priate to apply if the employment discrimination cases involved race,
it is similarly appropriate to apply where an employment discrimina-
tion case involves sex; like race discrimination, sex discrimination is an
enumerated term that is granted protection under Title VII.207 Ac-
cordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, just as in Loving where
a white man would not have been discriminated against had his wife
been white, the plaintiffs in Evans and Hively would not have been
discriminated against had they been heterosexual.208 For the purpose
of Title VII, discrimination on the basis of marrying a person of an-
other race is equivalent to discrimination on the basis of marrying a
person of another sex.209 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit appropriately
applied Loving’s comparative analysis method.
199. Id. at 357 (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
200. Id. at 346.
201. Leon Friedman, Overruling the Court, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), http://prospect.
org/article/overruling-court.
202. Id.; see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
203. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342.
204. Id.
205. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
206. Id. at 12.
207. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 342.
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Both the majority and the concurring opinion of the Seventh Circuit
heavily emphasized the evolving direction of society’s attitude toward
same-sex relationships.210 Ignoring this evolution would be in opposi-
tion to the “strong foothold in current popular opinion.”211 The fact
that society is learning to embrace non-traditional couples is a real-
ity.212 The Seventh Circuit noted that it took a substantial amount of
time for the judicial system to recognize that both sexual harassment
and sex-stereotyping, including same-sex stereotyping, were forms of
sex discrimination.213 Now, the judicial system must address sexual
orientation discrimination as a form of same-sex stereotyping.214 Con-
sequently, sex discrimination should be appropriately expanded to en-
compass sexual orientation discrimination.
By ensuring that every base was covered, the Hively court produced
a well-supported and thorough decision that connected all applicable
jurisprudence.215 Where one argument fell short, the court made sure
to supplement it with another supporting argument.216 The fact that
sex discrimination has come to be understood as one meaning does
not preclude it from being understood to include another meaning.217
IV. IMPACT
Title VII was enacted to give employees protection against discrimi-
nation in the employment realm.218 Prior to the enactment of Title
VII, employers had the biased power to legally fire an employee
solely based on the employee’s race, or to reject an applicant solely
based on his or her gender.219 Title VII’s enumerated protections220
were intended to clarify the forms of protections that employees have
210. See id. at 357, 361.
211. Id. at 361.
212. Twenge, supra note 174.
213. Hively, 853 F.3d at 355.
214. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 156–159 (discussing sexual orientation dis-
crimination as same-sex stereotyping).
215. Alison Frankel, The shrewdness of Judge Wood’s opinion in LGBT workplace bias case,




218. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/civil-rights-act (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
219. Dawn Rosenberg McKay, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, BALANCE CAREERS,
https://www.thebalance.com/title-vii-of-the-civil-rights-act-of-1964-525697 (last updated Feb. 24,
2018).
220. Title VII forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
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against their employers.221 However, as time has shown, the clarifica-
tions have incongruously spurred doubt. The scope of Title VII’s pro-
tections are unclear. This section discusses the drawbacks created by
inconsistency in the law. First, this section uses the influence of the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Hively as a platform to explain the impor-
tance of uniformity in federal appellate court decisions. Second, it dis-
cusses the economic consequences of employment discrimination.
Third, this section examines society’s evolving attitude towards sexual
orientation and explains why Title VII should be amended to parallel
social attitudes.
A. The Importance of Uniformity
The Seventh Circuit’s holding is already gaining traction among the
other federal appellate courts. Most recently, the Second Circuit
adopted the Seventh Circuit’s approach to interpreting Title VII
broadly to include claims of sexual orientation discrimination as a ba-
sis for a cause of action.222 In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Zarda, a
skydiving instructor, claimed he was fired due to his sexuality.223
Zarda had disclosed his sexuality to a female client on a skydiving
excursion and, after discovering the information Zarda had disclosed,
the client’s boyfriend reported Zarda to Zarda’s employer, Altitude
Express.224 Altitude Express argued that Zarda was actually fired in
response to complaints of inappropriate behavior.225 Hearing the case
for the first time, the Second Circuit rejected sexual orientation dis-
crimination as a cause of action under Title VII, explaining that “a
three-judge panel of this Court lacks the power to overturn Circuit
precedent.”226 Rehearing the case en banc, the Second Circuit held
that “Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion as discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”227 The Second Circuit
overturned a line of precedential cases that, at the time they were de-
221. See Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of specifically enumerated grounds: ‘race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.’ . . . Its purpose to eliminate these invidious forms of discrimination is clear.”).
222. Alan Feuer & Benjamin Weiser, Civil Rights Act Protects Gay Workers, Appeals Court
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/nyregion/gender-discrim-
ination-civil-rights-lawsuit-zarda.html.
223. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2017) rev’d, Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
224. Id. at 80.
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000); Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–19 (2d Cir. 2005) (reaffirming Simonton)).
227. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
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cided, reflected the view of other federal courts and the EEOC.228
However, these views have since evolved.229
The Second Circuit’s opinion mirrored the approach taken by the
Seventh Circuit. The Second Circuit acknowledged that although
Congress may not have anticipated “sex” to encompass claims of sex-
ual orientation discrimination when enacting Title VII, it does not fol-
low that courts cannot “give effect to the broad language that
Congress used.”230 The Second Circuit’s opinion emphasized the
evolution of the judicial landscape set forth by the Supreme Court in
seminal cases like Price Waterhouse231 and Oncale,232 and it applied
the comparative test to interpret the nexus between sex discrimination
and sexual orientation discrimination.233 After conducting the same
analysis as the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit similarly concluded
that sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation discrimina-
tion.234 The Second Circuit’s holding in Zarda widened the existing
split among the federal appellate courts and made clear the immediate
influence of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Hively.235
It can be argued that expanding the scope of Title VII will lead to
an increase in the number of cases filed in federal court; establishing a
new cause of action under Title VII will permit individuals to file law-
suits against conduct not previously prohibited by law. Federal court
dockets are already congested,236 and this results in decreased effi-
ciency and delays in obtaining relief.237 However, these arguments are
inadequate bases to reject claims of sexual orientation discrimination
altogether. With such logic, aversion to increased caseload will fore-
close the possibility of instituting a new cause of action.
In reality, these disagreements underwrite a bigger picture. Failure
to concretely define “sex” generates uncertainty in employment prac-
tices. While heterosexual employees are protected from employment
228. Id. at 114–15.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 115.
231. Id. at 117.
232. Id. at 115.
233. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 116.
234. Id. at 119.
235. Eversheds Sutherland LLP, Circuit split grows–Second Circuit expands protection under
Title VII based on sexual orientation, JD SUPRA (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/circuit-split-grows-second-circuit-57441/.
236. See, e.g., Federal Court Management Statistics, U.S. COURTS 35 (2018), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0630.2018.pdf (reporting
that as of June 2018, more than one of every five (22.9%) civil cases pending in United States
District Courts were over three years old).
237. See, e.g., MEC Resources, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 218, 227 (D. Del. 2017)
(noting a “busy docket” as the reason for transferring the case to another court).
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discrimination, the contradictory holdings of Evans and Hively have
made it possible for some homosexual employees to “be exposed to
discrimination at work just because they’re gay.”238 Whether there ex-
ists an applicable law to remedy employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation merely depends on one’s physical location within
the United States.239 Currently, seventeen states do not have any law
that prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.240 Moreover, around half of the country’s LGBTQ population
is located in the states where employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation is not prohibited by any state law.241 This means
that around half of the LGBTQ population in the United States does
not have a defense to discrimination on the basis of their sexual orien-
tation in the workplace.242 Such inconsistency in the law is problem-
atic and calls for uniformity.
B. Economic Considerations
The importance of this issue is not limited to political considera-
tions. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has direct eco-
nomic consequences.243 The uncertainty surrounding Title VII’s
protections regarding sexual orientation discrimination presents a se-
rious risk to the economic security of LGBTQ employees. About four
percent of the national workforce, or eight million people, identifies
as LGBTQ.244 About one out of every four employees that openly
238. Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Gays, N.Y. TIMES (July
27, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/nyregion/justice-department-gays-workplace.html.
239. Evans Gibbs, What’s Happening With Sexual Orientation Discrimination In The Work-
place?, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 13, 2017, 3:15 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/11/whats-hap
pening-with-sexual-orientation-discrimination-in-the-workplace/. See also Introduction to the
Federal Court System, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts
(last visited Dec. 26, 2017).
240. State Maps of Laws & Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/
employment (last updated June 11, 2018). Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have
laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Id. One state
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation only. Id. Six states prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity, but only against public employees. Id. Five
states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but only against public employ-
ees. Id.
241. Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.
org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (last updated Aug. 18, 2018).
242. Id.
243. CHRISTY MALLORY ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST LGBT PEOPLE IN GEORGIA 25 (2017), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/Economic-Impact-of-Discrimination-and-Stigma-against-LGBT-People-in-Georgia-FI-
NAL-4.pdf.
244. CHRISTY MALLORY & M.V. LEE BADGETT, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT OF ADDING SEX-
UAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY TO TEXAS’S EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-1\DPL105.txt unknown Seq: 30  7-JAN-19 10:04
98 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:69
identify as LGBTQ report that their employer has mistreated them
because of their sexual orientation,245 and as a result, about one out of
every ten LGBTQ employees quits.246 This “job instability and high
turnover” frequently “result[s] in greater unemployment and poverty
rates for gay and transgender people.”247 Unemployment and overall
economic insecurity is prominent in the LGBTQ community due to a
number of factors.248 These factors include: invisibility in public policy
considerations, which means that LGBTQ needs are disregarded by
society; sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, which
often results in lower wages for LGBTQ employees; and the gender
wage gap, which means the absence of a male earner in female same-
sex relationships makes such relationships more susceptible to pov-
erty.249 In fact, in 2009, male homosexuals had higher poverty rates
than their heterosexual counterparts.250 Additionally, adult lesbian
women are consistently twice as likely to live in poverty than their
heterosexual counterparts251 with twenty-four percent of adult lesbian
women living below the federal poverty line.252 Providing federal pro-
LAW 1 (2012), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Mallory_Badgett_TX_
Workplace_Dec-2012.pdf. However, this statistic may underestimate the actual percentage of
employees who identify as LGBTQ because employees are not required to disclose their sexual
orientation to employers and “[f]orty-six percent of LGBTQ workers say they are closeted at
work.” DEENA FIDAS & LIZ COOPER, A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: UNDERSTANDING THE CLIMATE
FOR LGBTQ WORKERS NATIONWIDE 6 (2018), https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/
AWorkplaceDivided-2018.pdf?_ga=2.116055045.281973929.1539983470-1343015097.1539289197.
245. A Survey of LGBT Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (June 13, 2013), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/06/13/a-survey-of-lgbt-americans/#fn-17196-1 (“21% [of LGBT
adults] say they have been treated unfairly by an employer.”).
246. 2017 Workplace Equality Fact Sheet, OUT & EQUAL, http://outandequal.org/2017-work-
place-equality-fact-sheet/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) (“Nearly one in 10 LGBT employees have
left a job because the environment was unwelcoming.”).
247. Crosby Burns & Jeff Krehely, Gay and Transgender People Face High Rates of Work-
place Discrimination and Harassment, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 2, 2011, 9:00 AM), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/06/02/9872/gay-and-transgender-people-face-
high-rates-of-workplace-discrimination-and-harassment/.
248. New Report on LGBTQ Poverty Shows Need for More Resources and Research, NAT’L
LGBTQ TASK FORCE (May 1, 2018), http://www.thetaskforce.org/povertyreport/ (“[I]ndicators
of economic disparity including food insecurity, housing instability, low-wage earning potential,
and unemployment and under-employment are all heightened for LGBTQ communities.”).
249. Alyssa Schneebaum & M. V. Lee Badgett, Poverty in U.S. Lesbian and Gay Couple
Households, FEMINIST ECON. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/
13545701.2018.1441533?needAccess=true.
250. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & SERVICES AND ADVOCATES FOR GAY, LESBIAN,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER ELDERS, IMPROVING THE LIVES OF LGBT OLDER ADULTS
11–12 (2010), https://www.lgbtmap.org/file/improving-the-lives-of-lgbt-older-adults.pdf.
251. Id.
252. Nico Sifra Quintana, Poverty in the LGBT Community, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 1,
2009, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/07/pdf/lgbt_
poverty.pdf.
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tections against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation would boost LGBTQ individuals’ ability to gain economic
equality.253
The economic consequences of employment discrimination are not
limited to the individual.254 The economic consequences of sexual ori-
entation discrimination can also be felt by the employer company, the
company’s market, and the overall economy. First, discrimination fos-
ters an intolerable workplace environment that causes mistreated em-
ployees to quit, which produces substantial turnover costs for the
company.255 Employee turnover as a result of workplace discrimina-
tion costs the nation an average of $64 billion per year.256 These costs
could instead be expended more productively by directing these funds
toward advancing the company’s operations rather than toward han-
dling internal discrimination affairs. Second, tolerating discriminatory
practices prevents well-qualified individuals from working in positions
for which they are most qualified.257 In turn, propelling incompatible
or unqualified candidates puts companies at a competitive disadvan-
tage by diminishing chances of reaching optimal productivity.258
Third, a hostile work environment thwarts an employee’s ability to
efficiently perform the functions of the job by distracting the em-
ployee from her responsibilities, thereby reducing a company’s overall
productivity.259 However, a study conducted in 2013 revealed that
96% of the top fifty Fortune 500 companies that implemented pro-
diversity policies found that their company’s overall profitability in-
creased.260 In addition, a separate study conducted in 2010 that mea-
sured reactions in the market to companies’ implementation of pro-
253. Id.
254. AMY KLOBUCHAR, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX-
UAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 2–3 (2013), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/
files/82ab1377-99ee-41bc-a99a-fced35ca578c/enda—-final-11.5.13.pdf.
255. Harry Bradford, Workplace Discrimination Costs Businesses $64 Billion Every Year,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2012, 8:43 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/work
place-discrimination-costs-businesses-cap_n_1373835.html (last updated Dec. 6, 2017).
256. KLOBUCHAR, supra note 254 (citing Corporate Leavers Survey, SMASH (Jan. 7, 2007),
https://www.smash.org/corporate-leavers-survey/).
257. KLOBUCHAR, supra note 254.
258. KLOBUCHAR, supra note 254.
259. KLOBUCHAR, supra note 254.
260. KLOBUCHAR, supra note 254 (citing Tim Cook, Workplace Equality is Good for Business,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2013, 6:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/workplace-equality-is-good-
for-business-1383522254 (“[embracing people’s individuality] turns out to be great for the crea-
tivity that drives our business. We’ve found that when people feel valued for who they are, they
have the comfort and confidence to do the best work of their lives.”)); BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY
MALLORY, ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR ADOPTING LGBT-RELATED WORKPLACE POLICIES 2, 5–7
(2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Mallory-Sears-Corp-Statements-
Oct2011.pdf.
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diversity policies found that the stock prices of companies that imple-
mented pro-diversity policies exceeded those of similar companies
that lacked pro-diversity policies.261 The study explained that the
stock market success may be attributable to a more “satisfied, com-
mitted, motivated, and productive workforce that may increase an or-
ganization’s potential for profitability and sustained performance.”262
C. Social Considerations
Society’s attitudes toward traditional concepts are changing. When
enacting Title VII, Congress considered the types of discrimination it
thought were most serious given the socio-political climate of the
time.263 When Title VII was enacted in the 1960s, the right to marry
someone of the same sex was not recognized as a national issue.264
The Catholic Church publicly opposed gay marriage, and many be-
lieved that allowing same-sex marriages would undermine the institu-
tion of marriage.265 However, the Supreme Court’s decision to
recognize a fundamental right to marriage for same-sex couples in
Obergefell v. Hodges is demonstrative of society’s evolving acceptance
of same-sex relationships.266 Gallup’s annual Values and Beliefs 2017
survey reported that the percentage of Americans believing gay and
lesbian relationships are “morally acceptable” rose from 40% in 2001
to 63% in 2017.267 Congress has amended Title VII several times since
its enactment in 1964; supplemental legislation has led to prohibitions
on discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,268 disability,269 and
261. Peng Wang & Joshua L. Schwarz, Stock Price Reactions to GLBT Nondiscrimination
Policies, 49 HUM. RES. MGMT. 195, 209 (2010), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/
hrm.20341.
262. Id.
263. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 3, at 2018 (1963) (“It is, however, possible and necessary for
the Congress to enact legislation which prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most
serious types of discrimination.”).




266. See discussion supra Part III.A.
267. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Hold Record Liberal Views on Most Moral Issues, GALLUP
(May 11, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/210542/americans-hold-record-liberal-views-moral-
issues.aspx. In fact, Americans were reported as having record-breaking liberal views on a ma-
jority of the issues surveyed. Id.
268. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). The Act reads in
relevant part:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
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age270—none of which were originally enumerated, protected classes
under Title VII.
Despite this progressiveness, many homosexual individuals are left
without recourse when terminated from their employment as a result
of discrimination in the workplace. Accordingly, it is necessary that
Title VII’s enumerated term “sex” be clarified and expanded.
V. CONCLUSION
It is illegal to discriminate against an employee based on race, relig-
ion, national origin, age, disability, or sex. Protection against these
forms of discrimination is embedded in Title VII. However, concern
has surrounded the vague landscape of Title VII’s protections, specifi-
cally the protection against sex discrimination. In particular, debate
surrounds the question of whether or not discrimination on the basis
of an employee’s sexual orientation is within the scope of Title VII’s
protection against sex discrimination. Consequently, federal courts
have struggled to apply a uniform interpretation of Title VII’s
protections.
Given today’s social climate and the direction of Supreme Court
precedent, it is time for a decisive interpretation of Title VII’s protec-
tion against sex discrimination. Though Congress did not consider sex-
ual orientation when enumerating sex as a prohibited basis for
discrimination under Title VII, existing precedent is demonstrative of
an evolving judicial movement directed toward Title VII’s protection
against sex discrimination encompassing sexual orientation discrimi-
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 2002e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to
permit otherwise.
Id.
269. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The Act reads in relevant
part:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability be-
cause of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Id.
270. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1967). The Act
reads in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s age; or (3) to reduce the wage rate
of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
Id.
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nation. The judiciary’s acceptance of sexual orientation protections re-
flects society’s evolving mentality.
Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s decision to expand the scope of Ti-
tle VII to include protection against discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation will support uniformity in employment practices and a
more successful economy in the face of an evolving society. Uniform-
ity throughout the federal court system will ensure that employment
practices are not allowed to assess an employee’s performance based
on sexual orientation. Closing this legislative gap would be a step in
the direction toward equal protection against discrimination for all in
the workplace.
Coco Arima
